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RECENT DECISIONS
Contracts - Material Benefit - Moral Obligation in Contracts
To Compensate By Legacy -Claimant,
who was not related to
the deceased, furnished him room, board, clothing and other incidental services for a period ending in 1936. Subsequently, in 1943,
as well as on later occasions, deceased orally promised her that whatever he had when he died was to go to her. She filed two claims
in the alternative, one for the entire estate, the other for the reasonable value of the services performed. The State contended that the
alleged claims were barred in that the statute of limitations, Sec.
330.19(3), had run before the deceased promised she would be
compensated when he died, and that, therefore, the promise was
unenforceable for lack of consideration in that it did not rest on
a legal obligation of the deceased. Further, since the statute of
limitations had run, Sec. 330.42, requiring an acknowledgement or
a new promise to be in writing signed by the party to be charged,
barred the enforcement of the oral promise. Held: The claim for
the entire estate cannot be allowed. However, clanant may recover
the reasonable value of services rendered. Past services performed
by a person not a member of the promisor's family are adequate considerations for a promise to compensate therefor by legacy. Where
the promise is to pay after the death of the promisor, the statute of
limitations does not begin to run until the time of the death when
he cause of action accrues. Since the cause does not rest on the revival of a prior legal or equitable obligation, section 330.42 is not
applicable. In re Estate of Herman Gerke, Deceased: State of Wisconsin, Appellant v. May Decimowich, Claimant, et al., Respondents,
271 Wis. 297, 73 N.W.2d 506 (1955).
The facts of this case bring it within a narrow area of contract
law which appears to be governed in Wisconsin by rules particularly
applicable thereto. An agreement to leave property to another as compensation for services previously rendered raises two questions, first,
the adequacy of the consideration, and second, the measure of recovery
in the action on the contract.
Although the trend of modern authorities is said to allow recognition of a moral obligation as adequate considertaion under the "material
benefit rule" where it can be shown that previously rendered services
were not intended to be gratuitous, 1 it is not clear whether Wisconsin
decisions in general contract law follow this liberal attitude. Past or
executed consideration in the absence of a prior legal or equitable
18 A.L.R.2d 787, supplementing 17 A.L.R. 1367; 79 A.L.R. 1346. Jurisdictions
cited as following the trend are U.S.C.A10th, Alabama, Kansas, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
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obligation, i.e. one resting on an express but not enforceable promise
to pay on which the promisee relied in rendering his performance,
has been held to raise an assumpsit only in those jurisdictions recognizing the doctrine of moral obligation. 2 Although some language
in a few early cases 3 appeared to indicate that past consideration could
support a later promise where the facts antecedent to the making of
the promise created a moral obligation to keep the promise, the doctrine
was rejected in Wisconsin prior to 1932. 4 Following the statement of
the doctrine of moral obligation, by way of dicta, in the Park Falls
decision, 5 a few cases allowed recovery for previously rendered services in actions brought on promissory notes. 6 An analysis of these cases
reveals "obiter in praise of moral obligation" 7 rather than a general
relaxation of the contract requirement of valid consideration.
Where, however, the promise was to compensate by legacy, or at
the death of the promisor, previously rendered services have been
recognized as adequate consideration. This rule, first stated in Jilson
v. Gilbert,8 has been followed consistently in a number of decisions
enforcing executory promises in actions on the contract against the
estate of the deceased promisor.9 Early decisions justify the adequacy
of the consideration merely on the ground that the making of a subsequent promise implies that the previously rendered services were
performed by the promisee in the expectation of receiving compensation therefor, rather than with a gratuitous intent.' 0 It has also been
said that the benefit to the promisor of the use and enjoyment of his
property during his lifetime was sufficient to support his executory
promise to compensate by legacy."
A parallel may be noted between the liberal rule applicable to con2

Page, Consideration,Genuine and Synthetic, 1947 Wis. L. REv. 483; Buer, The
Philosophy of Contractual Obligation, 21 MARQ. L. REv. 157, 194 (1937) 12
Am. JuR., CoNTRcAs §§97, 98.

aMessenger v. Miller, 2 Pin. 60 (1847); Brandeis v. Neustadtl, 13 Wis. 158
(1860).

4Frey v. City of Fond du Lac, 24 Wis. 204 (1869); Briggs v. Miller, 176 Wis.
321, 186 N.W. 163 (1922).
5 Park Falls State Bank v. Fordyce, 206 Wis. 628, 238 N.W. 516 (1932).
G Elbinger v.Capital and Teutonia Company, 208 Wis. 163, 242 N.W. 568 (1932);
Estate of Hatten, 233 Wis. 199, 288 N.W. 278 (1939) ; Estate of Schoenker-

man, 236 Wis. 313, 294 N.W. 810 (1940); Fraser Lumber and Manufacturing

Company v. Layendicker, 243 Wis. 25, 9 N.W.2d 97 (1943) ; Holmes v. Krueger,
271 Wis. 129, 72 N.W.2d 734 (1955), modification of teachers' retirement annuity contract.
7Page, supra note 2, at 498.
826 Wis. 637 (1870). The rule was held to constitute a good defense in an
action on a promissory note by the estate of the payee who had promised to
surrender it at the death for past services rendered.
9Silverthorn v. Wylie, 96 Wis. 69, 71 N.W. 107 (1897) ; Murtha v. Donohoo, 149
Wis. 481, 134 N.W. 406 (1912) ; Frieders v. Estate of Frieders, 180 Wis. 430,
193 N.W. 77 (1923).
10 Jilson v. Gilbert, supra; Silverthorn v. Wylie, supra note 9.
11 Murtha v. Donohoo, supra note 9.
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tracts to compensate by legacy and the so-called Wisconsin "cmoral
obligation" decisions in that, in the latter in several cases, 12 enforcement
of the subsequent promise was sought against the estate of the deceased promisor. The question may be raised whether the rule has
been extended to executory promises in general, or whether the nature
of the party against whom the claim is asserted affects the enforceability of promises allegedly lacking legal consideration. In the instant
case, the Court cites the rule of the Jilson case,' 3 and for the first
time relies on the doctrine of moral obligation as well.
Grounding the cause on the doctrine of moral obligation simplifies
the answer to the challenge of Sec. 330.4214 where the form of the
promise is oral rather than written. An earlier case held, in regard
to this section that the promise was "an independent and substitutionary contract within the rule of Jilson v. Gilbert." 5 When it is held
that the action rests on a promise supported by a moral obligation, and
that prior to the making of the promise no obligation recognized in
law existed, it becomes clear that there is no acknowledgement or
revival, and that, therefore, the statute is not applicable.
It should be noted that this decision and earlier cases' 6 establish
that a promise to compensate previously rendered personal services
by legacy may be in oral form. Since such a promise is performable
within one year, it is not in and of itself within the statute of frauds.
Where, as here, the nature of the thing promised does not consist of
real property to bring it within the statute of frauds, and where the
material benefit conferred on the promisor is in the nature of personal
services, there is no further statutory bar to the enforcement of the
oral promise.
Where an action is permitted for breach of promise to will property,
the general rule allows recovery of the value of the thing promised.'
Wisconsin, however, notwithstanding the recognition of the contract,
limits recovery to the reasonable value of the services rendered in case
of oral promises, or executed consideration when the amount promised
is not fixed or definite."" As the Court has stated, "to measure re12

13
14

Estate of Hatten, supra note 6; Estate of Schoenkerman, supra note 6.

Jilson v. Gilbert, supra.

WIS. STATS. (1955) §330.42: "No acknowledgement or promise shall be sufficient

evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take the cause out of the
operation of this chapter, unless the same be contained in some writing signed
by the party to be charged thereby."

Murtha v. Donohoo, supra note 9, at 487
Ir Jilson v. Gilbert, supra;Murtha v. Donohoo, supra note 9.
15

17 69

A.L.R. 79; 106 A.L.R. 742; Hirsh, Contracts to Devise and Bequeath, 9 Wis.
L. REv. 388, 398 (1934) ; see also 31 A.L.R. 127 et seq.
xs Murtha v. Donohoo, supra note 9; Frieders v. Estate of Frieders, supra note 9.
Oral promises: In re Bayliss v. Estate of Pricture, 24 Wis. 651, (1869) ; Slater
v. Estate of Cook, 93 Wis. 104, 67 N.W. 15 (1896).
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covery by the value of the estate would circumvent the statute of wills"'19
and make possible fraudulent claims against the estate of the deceased
promisor. Competent evidence as to the value of the agreed compensation merely has "some evidential bearing on the reasonable value
of the services rendered. 2 To allow more would in effect grant
21
specific performance to enforce a promised legacy.
Adherence to the rule of recognition of the contract with the
limitation of a quantum meruit recovery results in a somewhat anomalous situation. To establish the contract, the concept of valid consideration is exiended to its broadest possible limits. Should this decision become authority for executory promises in general, the "material benefit rule" would clearly be elevated beyond its present status
of dictum. The nature of the recovery, however, suggests an abandonment or denial of the contract, as though the promisee in the face of
a repudiation by the promisor who makes no testamentary disposition
embodying his promise, is restricted to a quasi-contract return of the
economic benefit conferred upon the promisor. Granting the soundness of the grounds on which rests the quantum meruit recovery, the
question arises why the action should be brought on the contract at
all. As a practical matter, to further the interest of justice, there is
justification for this rule. In many instances, as here, the services for
which compensation is sought were rendered long before the promisor's
death. If the promisee attempts to recover in quasi-contract, the
statute of limitations, Sec. 330.19(3),22 or Sec. 330.21(5), 2 3 bars the
action since the period begins to run from the time of the completion
of the services. 21 Where, however, the action is brought on the promise
to compensate by legacy, it is well settled that the cause of action does
not accrue until the death of the promisor.2 5 Sec. 330.14,26 which
must be read in conjunction with the subsequent sections of the
statute, thus postpones the running of the period until that time and
permits a trial of the claim.
MARIA

LUBITZ

19 Frieders v. Estate of Frieders, supra note 9, at 434.
2
0 Murtha v. Donohoo, supra note 9, at 486.

Frieders v. Estate of Frieders, supra note 9.
WIs. STATS. (1955) §330.19(3) : "An action upon any other contract, obligation
or liability, express or implied, except those mentioned in Sections 330.16 and
330.18."
23 WIs. STATS. (1955) §330.21 (5) : "Any action to recover unpaid salary, wages, or
other compensation for personal services, except fees for professional serv-

21

22

ices. .

..

Estate of Leu, 172 Wis. 530, 179 N.W. 796 (1920).
22 Jilson v. Gilbert, supra; Estate of Schaefer, 261 Wis. 431, 53 N.W.2d 427,
(1951).
2GWIs. STATS. (1955) §330.14: "The following actions must be commenced within
the periods respectively hereinafter prescribed after the cause of action has
accrued."
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